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Does Arbitraging Matter? 
Spatial Trade Models and Discriminatory Trade Policies 
When modeling discriminatory trade policies -- such as targeted embargoes, selective 
quotas, targeted export or import subsidies, or preferential trading agreements -- failure to 
explicitly include assumptions about arbitraging behavior may yield to misleading results. 
Quadratic programming (QP), Non Linear Programming (NLP), and Vector Sandwich 
(VS) models implicitly set the rules regarding the possibility of simultaneous exporting and 
importing.  The result is that many analysis using these models may lead to poor results 
because the models contain implicit limits on arbitraging which may be at variance with the 
actual policies and/or country behavior. 
The paper introduces an alternative spatial model.  Its main features are that countries are 
allowed to switch from one side of the market to the other as prices change, and that the 
researcher is allowed to explicitly incorporate her own assumptions about arbitraging and/or 
obtain different possible solutions as a function of different policy constraints or different 
levels of effectiveness in enforcing such constraints.  Two numerical examples, one 
addressing the 1980 US embargo to USSR, the other, constructed, involving preferential 
trading, show how the results obtained using the proposed model compare with those obtained 
by applying the most frequently used spatial trade models. 
Key words:  Trade, spatial models, arbitraging, discriminatory trade policy, embargo, 
preferential tariff. Does Arbitraging Matter?  Spatial Trade Models and Discriminatory Trade 
Policies* 
Failure to explicitly include assumptions about arbitraging behavior causes traditional spatial trade 
models to yield misleading results.  The issue becomes important when economists attempt to model 
discriminatory national trade policies intended to benefit friends and/or punish enemies.  Examples 
of such policies abound in the real world such as asp preferences, Lome' Convention preferences, 
targeted export subsidies, PL 480, selective quotas and targeted embargoes.  These policy 
approaches necessarily create multiple prices and generate possibilities to simultaneously export and 
import to take advantage of price spreads.  Almost all of these discriminatory trade policies, 
frequently pursued by developed countries, attempt to prohibit arbitraging by targeted countries. 
Yet most frequently used trade models do not explicitly address the arbitraging question.  The result 
is that many analyses using these models lead to poor results because the models contain implicit 
limits on arbitraging which may be at variance with the actual policy. 
This paper argues that unless trade models explicitly incorporate assumptions about the 
possibility of simultaneous exporting and importing, the selection of the trade model implicitly sets 
the rules on arbitrage behavior.  For example spatial trade models using reduced form trade 
equations generally exclude by assumption the possibility of switching or of simultaneously 
exporting and importing.  This paper reviews often used models, then presents an alternative model 
and concludes with two numerical examples. 
Specifically, the first part of the paper discusses the role played by arbitraging in the design 
and management of discriminatory agricultural trade policies.  The implications for empirical trade 
policy analysis of different assumptions about the possibility of arbitraging are briefly addressed. 
In the second part, the implicit hypotheses about arbitraging associated with three classes of 
spatial models - Quadratic Programming (QP) models, Non Linear Programming (NLP) models and 
Vector Sandwich (VS) models - are discussed in detail. 2 
An alternative model is presented in the third part of the paper.  Its main features are that 
countries are allowed to switch from one side of the market to the other as prices change, and that 
the user is allowed to incorporate her assumptions about the possibility of arbitraging.  The model 
presented represents an improvement over the other spatial trade models when the policy issues 
addressed include, for example, trade liberalization when preferential trade agreements exist, an 
embargo, or a targeted export subsidy.  Two numerical examples, one addressing the 1980 US 
embargo to USSR, the other, constructed, involving preferential trading, show how the results 
obtained using the proposed model compare with those obtained by applying the three classes of 
models mentioned above. 
Discriminatory Agricultural Trade Policies and Arbitraging 
World agricultural markets abound in discriminatory trade policies.  These include 
preferential tariffs, targeted export subsidies, embargoes, customs unions, food aid and preferential 
import quotas.  In all of these types of policies the granting country must be concerned with 
preventing the recipient country from re-exporting subsidized imports, or exporting under 
preferential agreements imports from non-preferred countries.  In this section several examples are 
reviewed to determine how countries attempt to deal with the problem of arbitrage. 
The United States has many preferential agricultural tariff reduction agreements including its 
Generalized System of Preferences (G.S.P.), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Israeli free trade 
agreement and the recently concluded US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.  Other discriminatory 
trade policies include the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (PL 480), the 
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and a series of targeted embargoes including those against the 
USSR in 1974, 1975 and 1980-81. 
In all of these cases additional policy instruments are necessary. On preferential imports 
(GSP) the United States applies a "rule of origin" which requires at least 35% (50% if two preferred 
countries involved) of the value of the article to have been added in the developing country.  The 
definitions of qualified LDC "production and/or processing" take several pages.  The same 3 
constraints apply to duty free treatment under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (Organization of 
American States).  The United States-Canada free trade agreement contains a substantial set of rules 
of origin to prevent reexport when different third country tariffs apply in the two countries.  PL 480 
contains language and rules to prevent concessional shipments from disrupting (lowering prices) 
commercial markets and seeks "commitment from participatory countries that will prevent resale or 
transhipment to other countries, or use, for other than domestic purposes, of surplus agricultural 
commodities purchased under the act" (sect. 101).  The rules attempt to prevent arbitraging and try 
to freeze other trade flows of the beneficiary country. 
To enter the EEC under the preferential tariffs granted by the Lome' Convention, exports 
from the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries have to fulfill the conditions stated in 
Protocol 1 of the Convention, concerning the definition of the concept of "originating products. ,,1 
Products originating in the ACP countries are defined, in simple terms, as products wholly obtained 
in one or more ACP countries, or products which have undergone sufficient working or processing 
within the ACP countries.  Essentially, the entire Protocol deals with the definition of what 
sufficient means.  A similar condition is contained in the EEC's asp scheme (EEC).  Borrmann, 
Borrmann and Stegger (p.  117-120) argue that the "rules of origin" may have strongly affected the 
volume of trade generated through the EEC's asp scheme. 
A "country of origin" constraint is contained in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) agreement.  The preferential tariffs apply to products wholly produced or obtained in 
ASEAN countries or to products for which non-ASEAN content does not exceed the 50% of the 
f.o.b. value (40% in case of Indonesia), and the final stage of manufacture must be performed in the 
ASEAN exporting country. 
In all these preferential tariff reduction agreements, the inclusion of constraints to make sure 
that the exports are originating in the beneficiary country is dictated by the desire to avoid 
arbitraging and prevent third countries from taking advantage of the preferential policy.  Constraints 
on the volume of exports which may be shipped under the preferential treatment are usually 4 
included as well.  This reinforces the argument that limiting arbitraging is definitely an issue in the 
design of preferential tariff policies. 
However, it should be noted that the various "rules of origin" still leave some space for 
arbitraging.  The preferred country can still find it feasible and profitable to import and export at the 
same time, using low price imports for domestic consumption while exporting at a higher 
preferential price domestic production.  In this case, if  no binding ceiling is placed on the volume of 
the preferred country's exports, the quantity arbitraged is implicitly constrained by the "rules of 
origin" not to exceed domestic consumption. 
As discussed later on in the paper, empirical simulations of the embargo's impact on world 
trade and on the availability of the embargoed commodities (and of their substitutes) in USSR 
critically depend on the assumptions made about the degree of cooperation of the other exporters 
and on the possibility for third countries to arbitrage (USDA). 
In real world discriminatory trade policies arbitraging does matter.  In many cases, failing to 
avoid its occurrence crucially affects the possibility of reaching the expected policy goals. 
Modeling Discriminatory Trade Policies 
When discriminatory trade policies are considered, the models which may be used in 
empirical analyses are restricted to the class of the spatial ones, those able to reproduce, in addition 
to the net trade positions of each of the regions considered, the flows between each pair of them. 
Because of the presence of discriminatory policies, each region may buy (sell) from (to) different 
regions at different prices, collecting (paying) different per unit tariffs (subsidies).  As a result, the 
determination of the net trade positions needs to be based on a model capable of differentiating by 
origin the imports of each region. 
Any discriminatory trade policy can be equivalently expressed in terms of a tariff or a 
subsidy.  Targeted embargoes can be seen as the imposition of a country specific prohibitive export 
tariff.  Country specific export (import) quotas may be translated into two export (import) taxes: 5 
one, equal to zero, active up to the quota ceiling, the other, prohibitive, active above that ceiling. 
Food donations may be seen as volume constrained subsidized exports. 
Any solution obtained by using a spatial trade model is such that, for each possible trade flow, 
say from country i to country j, the domestic prices (Pi and Pj  , respectively), must satisfy the 
following relation  (as long as no constraint is placed on the trade flow): 
(1)  (pr Pi  -ljj + O'ij  - 1I'ij)  ~ 0  ; 
(2)  (pr Pi  - ljj + O'ij  - 1I'ij) Xij =  0 ; 
where ljj is the fixed transportation cost to ship one unit of the commodity from region i to region j, 
O'ij is the export, subsidy that country i pays to its producers for each unit exported to country j, 1I"ij  is 
the import tariff that country j imposes on each unit it imports from country i, and Xij is the non-
negative trade flow from country i to country j.  If  there is a positive trade flow from country i to 
country j, then the per unit transportation cost plus the tariff minus the subsidy must give the wedge 
between the two domestic prices.  If  there are no shipments from country i to country j, then the 
difference between the two domestic prices must be smaller or, at the most, equal to the 
transportation cost plus the tariff minus the subsidy, implying that shipments from country i to 
country j are not profitable. 
In absence of any intervention, the only possible wedges between domestic prices of trading 
countries are transportation costs.  The matrix of the transportation costs may be said to be 
consistent, meaning that the minimum cost path to ship from region i to region j is always the one 
directly connecting the two regions.  If this is the case, there is no rationality for arbitraging.
2  From 
the viewpoint of the conditions to be satisfied by the solution to the problem, transportation costs, 
subsidies and tariffs are undifferentiated.  Given domestic demands and supplies, the only thing that 
matters in finding the market spatial equilibrium is, for each ordered pai2 of countries, the net sum 
of the transportation cost plus the import tariff minus the export subsidy.  This quantity can be 
thought of as a generalized transportation cost. 6 
The addition and the subtraction to the transportation costs matrix of non-discriminatory 
tariffs and subsidies does not affect its consistency.  However, this property may be disrupted by the 
existence of discriminatory trade policies.  It can vanish as a result of the implementation of 
preferential tariffs, or targeted subsidies.  It is lost when country specific embargos are imposed. 
The generalized transportation costs matrix being no longer consistent, is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for arbitraging to be profitable.  4 
Most agricultural trade models are based on an a priori definition of the sets of the importing 
and exporting regions.  Each country is represented through its excess demand or supply schedule. 
By doing so, the possibility of arbitraging, as well as the possibility of a country switching from one 
side of the market to the other as prices change, is assumed away. 
When each country's position on the world market is not set a priori, the assumptions about 
the possibility of arbitraging are generally left to the structural characteristics of the specific model 
used.  These assumptions may strongly affect the solutions obtained.  For example, in a model with 
no transportation costs, when arbitraging is left free to occur the imposition of a tariff only on 
imports from a specific subset of countries leaves each region's net trade positions unchanged.  Only 
trade flows change.  However, a very different outcome is obtained if each region is constrained not 
to import and export at the same time. 
Discriminatory Trade Policies and Most Commonly Used Trade Models 
(a) Quadratic Programming Models; 
The most commonly used spatial trade models are the ones developed by Takayama and 
Judge (Thompson, p. 28).  This class of spatial trade models involves the maximization of a 
quadratic objective function subject to a set of linear constraints.  Linear demand and supply 
functions, large countries and perfect competition, both on the domestic and the world markets, are 
assumed (Takayama and Judge 1964 and 1971, Bawden, Takayama). 
Takayama and Judge (1971, chpt. 10) propose a framework to analyze trading when tariffs 
and subsidies are present.  They suggest that this framework can also be used when discriminatory 7 
trade policies are active.5  Two alternative modeling approaches, one based on domestic demand and 
supply functions (Takayama and Judge 1971, chpts. 7 and 8), the other based on excess 
supply/demand functions (Takayama and Judge 1971, chpt. 9), are proposed.  They claim that in a 
very large spectrum of standard cases the two models are equivalent, and that the second one may be 
much more efficient.  However, it is shown that, when discriminatory trade policies are considered, 
the equivalence of the two models may vanish.  The/irst model - the one which uses domestic 
demand and supply functions - leaves each country free to import and export at the same time, but 
puts an implicit constraint on the imports, which cannot exceed domestic consumption.  The second 
model leaves the possibility of arbitraging totally free. 
Let's consider the approach based on domestic demand and supply functions first.  Following 
Samuelson, the problem is solved maximizing an artificial net quasi-welfare function under a set of 
linear constraints.  The quasi-welfare function may be seen as the sum of consumers' and producers' 
surpluses over all the regions considered.  Using Takayama and Judge's notation, the model (in its 
quantity formulation)6 may be stated as: 
(3)  max NW(y, x, X) = X'y - v'x - 1/2 y'Oy - 1/2 x'Hx - (T+1I'-u)'X 
(4)  s.t.  ax  ~ 
(5)  y  ~ 0; x  ~ 0; X  ~ 0 ; 
where: 
- y is the (nx1) vector of the quantities consumed in each country; 
- x is the (nx1) vector of the quantities produced in each country; 
- X is the (n2xl) vector of the trade flows (xII' x12'··' x1n' ..... ,xn1' xn2'··' xnn); 
- X is the (nx1) vector of the constant terms in each region's inverse demand function; 
- v is the (nx1) vector of the constant terms in each region's inverse supply function; 
- 0 is a (nxn) diagonal matrix of the absolute value of the slopes in each region's inverse demand 
function; 
- H is the (nxn) diagonal matrix of the slopes in each region's inverse supply function; 8 
- T is the (n2x1) vector of the transportation costs (t11' t12""  tIn' ..... , tn1' ~2""  ~n; where tij is 
the transportation cost to ship one unit of the commodity from region i to region j); 
- 1t is the (n2x1) vector of the import tariffs (1t 11' 1t 12""  1t In' ..... , 1t n1' 1t n2'''' 1t nn; where 1tij is 
the per unit tariff imposed by country j on its imports from country i); 
- 0' is the (n2x1) vector of the export subsidies (0'11' 0'12""  O'ln' ..... , O'n1'  O'n2'''' O'nn; where O'ij is 
the subsidy paid by country i for each unit exported to country j); 
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To satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated to this first model the solution to the 
problem must be such that [Takayama and Judge 1971, (7.2.9.d) p. 133]:7 
(7) 
(8) 
~. x*·· - y*'  ~ 0  and  [:E. x*·· - y*.] p*. = 0  i=l  n'  oWJ  Jl  l'  J  Jill  '  , •• " 
- ~. x*·· + x*·  ~ 0  and  [-~. x*·· + x*·] p*. = 0  i=l  n'  oWJ  IJ  l'  oWJ  IJ  1  1  '  , •• " 
where Pi is the domestic price in country i, and the * indicates values of the variables at the 
optimum.  If  domestic price is different from zero: (i) domestic consumption must be equal to the 
portion of the domestic production which is consumed domestically plus the sum of all the imports 
from the other countries, and (ii) domestic production must be equal to the portion which is 
consumed domestically plus the sum of all exports to the other regions.  Each country may import 
and export at the same time, with the constraint that in each country imports cannot exceed domestic 
consumption. When domestic consumption is entirely satisfied through imports, the domestic 
production is entirely exported.  This scenario can be described as one in which a constrained 
arbitraging can take place.  When this model is used and the constraint on arbitraging is binding, the 
arbitraging country's consumption and production prices are not equal.  The consumption price is 
linked to the low price prevailing in the region(s) where the imports come from, while the 
production price is linked to the high price prevailing in the region(s) exports are shipped to. 9 
This implicit constraint limiting arbitraging not to exceed the volume of the actual domestic 
consumption, reproduces a condition similar to that imposed by the different types of "rules of 
origin" observed in real world preferential trade agreements. 
When the second model, based on the use of excess supply/demand functions, is considered,8 
the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions apply [Takayama and Judge 1971, (9.l.27.d) p.  182; (9.3.4), 
p.194]: 
(9)  - Y*i + x*i + tj"i (- x*ij + x*ji)  ~ 0, i= 1, ... , n; 
(to)  [- Y*i + x*i + tj"i (- x*ij + x*ji)] P*i = 0, i= 1, ... , n. 
If the domestic price is different from zero, domestic production minus domestic consumption 
plus imports minus exports must be equal to zero.  Arbitraging is now left totally unconstrained. 
When discriminatory trade policies are present, by applying the two models to the same 
setting different results can be obtained.  This will certainly happen whenever in the solution 
obtained by using the model based on excess demand and supply functions (a) at least one region 
acts at the same time as an exporter and an importer, and (b) its imports are larger than its domestic 
consumption. 
Whenever QP models are used to analyze markets characterized by discriminatory policies 
such that the generalized transportation costs matrix is not consistent, strong assumptions about the 
possibility of arbitraging occurring are implicitly made.  Such assumptions may have serious 
implications for the conclusions reached in terms of the trade policy analysis. 
(b) Non Linear Programming Models; 
Although QP models have been extensively used in agricultural trade analyses, the 
assumption regarding the linearity of the demand and supply functions they rely on is quite strong. 
Rowse, arguing that the availability of powerful nonlinear programming software is not a serious 
constraint any more, suggested a mathematical programming framework to solve problems 
involving nonlinear demand and supply functions.9  His model, essentially, expands on the QP 
formulation.  A quasi-welfare function is maximized under a set of linear constraints.  Rowse's 10 
fonnulation of the problem allows for the specification of supplying and consuming regions.  If each 
region is a priori defined either as a supplier or as a consumer, then, as mentioned earlier, an implicit 
no arbitraging constraint is imposed.  However, in general, each country can be represented as both 
a consuming and producing region.  In this case, keeping the notation used so far, the model may be 
described as follows: 
(11)  max NW(y, x, X) = ~i 8i(Yi) - ~i  IPi(~) - (T + 'Jr  - O)'X ; 
(12)  s.t. : 
(13)  y  ~  0,  x  ~  0,  X ~ 0, 
where 8i(Yi) and IPi(xi) are the integrals under country i's inverse domestic demand between 0 and 
Yi' and country i's inverse domestic supply between 0 and~,  respectively. 
The QP model may be now seen as a particular specification of the general NLP fonnulation. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this problems are analogous to those of the QP formulation.  In 
particular, the solution of Rowse's NLP model must satisfy (7) and (8).  From the standpoint of 
handling discriminatory trade policies, what has been pointed out with respect to the QP approach 
applies to the general NLP fonnulation as well.  When countries' positions on the world market are 
not set a priori, the use of NLP models as fonnulated by Rowse leaves arbitraging possible, but in 
each country imports cannot exceed domestic consumption. 
(c) Vector Sandwich models; 
MacKinnon (1975, 1976) proposed the use of a vector sandwich procedure, based on one of 
the algorithms developed to compute Kakutani fixed points, to solve spatial trade equilibrium 
problems.1o  The procedure allows for the inclusion of nonlinear demand and supply functions as 
well as transportation costs.  Holland developed a microcomputer program based on MacKinnon's 
procedure to solve relatively small, single commodity, spatial equilibrium models.  Holland's 
program is well documented and allows for great flexibility.  It is capable of handling import and 
export tariffs, both ad valorem and per unit.  Constraints may be imposed on specific flows as well 11 
as on individual countries' overall imports or exports.  However, the possibility of the existence of 
discriminatory tariffs and subsidies is not considered.  Even so, the user can include them, fooling 
the program by giving the generalized transportation costs when asked by the program to provide 
the transportation costs.  Applications of the vector sandwich method in agricultural trade policy 
analyses include Holland and Sharples, and USDA (chpt. 11).  Basically, the procedure searches for 
a solution which satisfies standard economic equilibrium conditions.  Keeping the structure of the 
problem as close as possible to those discussed above, and allowing each country to be accounted 
for as a producer and a consumer at the same time, the model may be stated as follows: 
Find p, x, y, and X 
(14)  such that 
(15)  subject to: 
~(Pi) = tj  ~j , i=l,  .. , n; 
Yi(Pi) = tj Xji ' i=l,  .. , n; 
ti  ~  = ti  Yi; 
yli  ~  Yi 
xl·  1 
~  ~ 
~y~, 
~x~, 
X~j  ~  x·· 
1J  ~ XUij' 
Pi 
~  0, 
i=l,  .. , n; 
i=l,  .. , n; 
i,j=I,  .. , n; 
i=l, ... , n; 
Pi = minj [ 4(Pf xlji ~ Xji  ~ XUji) ] , i=l,  .. , n; 
Li(Pj) = [Pj + 1i + 1I'ji - 0ji] , i, j=l,  .. , n. 
If each country is considered as both consuming and producing, arbitraging is allowed but, 
again, it is constrained not to exceed domestic consumption.  Each country may import and export at 
the same time, but imports may not be re-exported. 
The Model 
In this section a spatial trade model is presented.  It should be used to analyze settings where 
discriminatory trade policies make the generalized transportation costs matrix inconsistent.  The 
model is given in two forms, one based on domestic supply and demand functions, the other based 
on excess demand/supply functions.  These functions do not have to be linear.  The model has two 12 
main features: (a) each country is left free to move from one side of the market to the other as prices 
change, and (b) the user is allowed to explicitly specify assumptions on the possibility of arbitraging 
to occur through the input of two sets of parameters. 
Table 1 and 2 synthesize the assumptions which are implicitly made when the models briefly 
reviewed above are used, and those which can be explicitly incorporated by the researcher when the 
model proposed in this paper is used.  When each country is a priori defined as an importing or an 
exporting country  -- as it is the case when NLP or VS models in which countries are represented 
either by an excess demand or an excess supply function are used -- arbitraging is simply ruled out. 
When QP, NLP and VS models in which each country is represented through both its domestic 
demand and supply functions are used, arbitraging is allowed, but it is constrained not to exceed the 
quantity which is consumed domestically.  In this case the implicit constraint reproduces the "rules 
of origin" attached to many preferential trade agreements, whose intent is to prevent the re-exporting 
of  imports from occurring.  Finally, when the QP model in which each country is represented by its 
excess demand/supply function is used, arbitraging is allowed and left totally unconstrained (Table 
1). 
When the model proposed in this paper is used, the researcher is allowed to explicitly 
incorporate his own assumptions about arbitraging.  The model based on domestic demand and 
supply functions can be constrained so that arbitraging (i) cannot occur, (ii) is allowed, but it is 
constrained not to exceed domestic consumption, or (iii) is allowed and left completely 
unconstrained.  When the model in which each country is represented through its excess 
demand/supply function is used, only the first and the third scenarios can be implemented (Table 2). 
In the model proposed only one commodity is considered.  In addition, a partial eqUilibrium 
framework, fixed exchange rates, and perfect competition on both the domestic and the world 
markets are assumed. 
Following Samuelson, Takayama and Judge, and Rowse the model maximizes an artificial 
quasi-welfare function (W) tied to the sum of  consumers and producers surplus over all the regions. 13 




[Takayama and Judge 1964 
and 1971 , Bawden, 
Takayama] 
Non Linear Programming 
Models 
[Rowse] 
Each country is represented 
through: 
linear domestic demand and 
supply functions 
a continuous linear excess 
demand and supply function 
non linear domestic demand and 
supply functions 
a non linear excess demand or 
supply function 
Vector Sandwich Models  linear or non linear domestic 
[MacKinnon 1975 and 1976;  demand and supply functions 
Holland] 
a linear or non linear excess 
demand or supply function 
Implicit assumptions about 
arbitraging 
arbitraging allowed, but 
constrained not to exceed 
domestic consumption (imports 
cannot be re-exported) 
arbitraging allowed and 
unconstrained 
arbitraging allowed, but 
constrained not to exceed 
domestic consumption (imports 
cannot be re-exported) 
arbitraging not allowed 
arbitraging allowed, but 
constrained not to exceed 
domestic consumption (imports 
cannot be re-exported) 
arbitraging not allowed Table 2-
Model 
14 
Assumptions about arbitraging which can be explicitly incorporated in the model 
proposed. 
Each country is represented 
through: 
Assumptions about 
arbitraging which can be 
explicitly incorporated 
Model proposed  linear or non linear domestic 
demand and supply functions 
- arbitraging allowed and 
unconstrained 
a linear or non linear continuous 
excess demand and supply 
function 
- arbitraging allowed, but 
constrained not to exceed 
domestic consumption 
- arbitraging not allowed 
- arbitraging allowed and 
unconstrained 
- arbitraging not allowed 15 
When domestic demand and supply functions are considered, the quasi-welfare function is defined 
as the sum of the areas below the domestic demand functions, minus the areas below the domestic 
supply functions, minus the transportation costs, minus the tariff revenue plus the subsidy 
expenditure: 
(16)  W - t·  9·(y·) - t· "'·(s·) - t .. [ (t  .. + 11'''  - (1") x .. ]  - 1  1  1  1"'1  1  IJ'J  IJ  IJ  IJ  . 
The model may be stated as follows: 
(17)  max  W 
~j 
subjec~ to: 
(18)  t? {[1-(ti - 1)/-2] [tj Xji - Xii] + [(ti - 1)/-2Utj Xij  - xii]} = 0,  i= I, .. , n; 
(19)  1/Ii (tj Xji - Xii) - Yi  ~ 0, i= 1, .. , n; 
(20)  ~  = tj  ~j - tj Xji'  i= 1, .. , n; 
(21)  Yi = max { Xii' Xii - Xi  } ,  i= 1, .. , n; 
(22)  si = Yi + Xi  '  i= 1, .. , n; 
(23)  Xij  ~ 0;  i, j = 1, .. , n; 
where: 
i and j denote the regions (i , j = 1, 2, ... , n); 
Yi denotes the quantity consumed in country i; 
si denotes the quantity produced in country i; 
9i(Yi) denotes the integral under the inverse domestic demand of region i, pdi(Yi)' between 0 and 
fPi(si) denotes the integral under the inverse domestic supply of region i, pSi(si), between 0 and 
Xij  denotes the flow of commodity from region i to region j; 
Xi denotes the total exports (if positive) or the total imports with the sign changed (if negative) 
of region i; 16 
~j denotes the fixed per unit transportation cost for shipping the commodity from region i to 
regionj;l1 
1I'ij denotes the per unit tariff imposed by region j on its imports from region i; 
O'ij denotes the subsidy paid by region i for each unit exported to region j; 
~i  denotes a parameter controlling the possibility of the i-th region to arbitrage, and, if 
arbitraging is not allowed, the side of the market on which it may appear.  This parameter may 
be set to be equal to -1, 0 or 1.  It will be equal to 0 for the non-beneficiary regions, and for the 
beneficiary ones which are left free to arbitrage; to -1 for the beneficiary countries which are not 
allowed to arbitrage and may operate on the market as importers only, to 1 for those which may 
operate as exporters only; 
"'i denotes a parameter constraining arbitraging, when it has been allowed to occur, not to 
exceed domestic consumption.  It will be  equal to 1 when country i'  s imports must not exceed 
its domestic consumption, to 0 otherwise. 
Constraints (20)-(23) are self-explanatory.  When "'i in (19) is set equal to 1, arbitraging 
cannot exceed domestic consumption.  When "'i is equal to 0 arbitraging is not constrained by (19). 
A more detailed discussion is needed to explain the rationale for (18).  This constraint allows the 
user to impose that regions do not arbitrage.  In addition, when arbitraging is not allowed, (18) 
imposes the position on the market (importer/exporter) that the region may take.  This is needed to 
evaluate what its position on the market will be.  In fact, if arbitraging is not allowed, each country 
may choose to appear on the world market either as an importer or as an exporter. 
In the case of a preferential tariff, for example, this implies the imposition by each beneficiary 
country of a prohibitive tariff either on its imports or on its exports, and, hence, an explicit policy 
choice.  Imports are taxed when the country wants to make use of the preference.  Exports are taxed, 
to make arbitraging unprofitable, when it finds itself better off by importing.  The decision is based 
on the maximization of the beneficiary country's welfare.  In many cases, this choice may be easy, 
as it is the case when only one country is granted a preferential treatment and it is already exporting 17 
prior to the implementation of the preferential tariff.  In other cases the choice may not be so 
obvious (Anania).  A beneficiary country may find it, for example, more profitable to remain on the 
importers' side of the market even if the preferential treatment granted would make it possible for it 
to act as an exporter.  When arbitraging is not allowed, the maximization of the world quasi-welfare 
may not be associated with the maximization of the welfare for each of the beneficiary regions.  As a 
result, the solution obtained may not reproduce the world market equilibrium which would take 
place given the assumptions on which the model is based.  When arbitraging is not allowed, the 
model has to be solved 2m times (m is the number of the beneficiary countries which are not 
allowed to arbitrage), once for each possible set of the f i'  s parameters.  By doing so, all possible 
scenarios linked to the beneficiary countries' possible choices will be considered. 
When more than one beneficiary country is present, to identify the market solution some sort 
of assumption is needed regarding the behavior of the beneficiary countries.  The decision of each of 
them, in fact, affects the decision of the others, and a game structure needs to be assumed.  In the 
second of the two numerical examples discussed below, the market solutions under two very simple 
different behavioral assumptions are presented: that the beneficiary countries collude, and that each 
of them makes its choice on the basis of its own welfare only.  When a collusive behavior is 
assumed, the market solution will be given by the one among the 2m associated with the highest 
value of the sum of the beneficiary countries' welfares.  The underlying assumption is that by doing 
so each of the colluding regions will be made better off through a system of  direct transfers among 
the countries entering the agreement.  The market solution will be given by the one associated with 
the 
(24)  maxs [ t k=1,  .. ,m Wk s  I s= 1,  .. , 2m] , 
where m is the number of the beneficiary countries, and Wk  s is country k's welfare associated with 
the s-th set of the fi's parameters.  When this behavior is assumed, a solution will always be found. 
The second approach leads to a more complex outcome.  When each beneficiary region decides to 
act as an importer or as an exporter on the basis of its own welfare only, three possible results may 18 
be reached: (a) no market solution can be identified, (b) several possible market solutions can be 
identified, (c) one market solution can be identified.  No market solution will be identified if at each 
of the solutions associated with the different sets of ~i's parameters, one or more of the beneficiary 
countries are better off by switching to the other side of the market.  Several possible market 
solutions will be identified if more than one of the 2m market solutions is such that no individual 
beneficiary region is better off by changing its position on the market.  A unique market equilibrium 
will be obtained when only one of the 2m solutions is such that no region is willing to switch to the 
other side of the market. 
Once the model has been solved, equilibrium prices may be computed as: 
(25)  pdi = pdi(Yi*) ; i=l,  .. , n; 
(26)  p\  = pSi(si*) ; i=1,  .. , n. 
Each country's producers' and consumers' welfare is here defined (Figure 1) as the area 
between the inverse demand function and the price12  line, plus the area between the price13  line and 
the horizontal axis or the inverse supply function, plus the tariff revenue (which is assumed to be 
redistributed to consumers and producers as a lump sum transfer): 
s·*  1 
(27) Wi = [8i(Yi*) - Yi* Pid(Yi*)] + [Pis(Si*) si*  - I  Pis(si) dSi] + I:j 1I'ji Xji'  i = 1, .. , n; 
max [O,Si'] 
where Si' is the intercept of the inverse supply function on the horizontal axis.  In Figure 1 S'  S is 
the inverse supply function, D'D is the inverse demand function, p is the equilibrium price, y* and 
s* are the quantities consumed and produced, respectively, and the cross-hatched areas sum up to 
the country's producers' and consumers' welfare. 
Often estimates of the domestic supply and demand functions for each of the regions to be 
included in the model are not available, while estimates of the excess demand/supply functions are. 
In addition, the excess functions can be more easily estimated.  For this reason, a formulation of the 
model which is based on excess functions is presented as well. 19 
price 
Df  s 
p 
y.  Sf  s·  quantity 
Figure  1  •  Welfare  components  for  an exporting  country. 20 
The structure of this model is essentially the same as the one based on the domestic demand 
and supply schedules.  In Figure 2 a simple two country world market case is presented. SaSa and 
SbSb are the inverse excess demand/supply functions of countries A and B, respectively.  The 
market equilibrium is such that region A imports -Xa from region B (-Xa is equal to Xb).  The 
equilibrium prices in the two regions are P  a and Pb, respectively.  The difference between the two 
prices is equal to the transportation cost of shipping one unit from B to A, plus the per unit import 
tariff imposed by country A, minus the per unit export subsidy paid by country B.  The cross-
hatched areas in Figure 2 represent the gains from trade, i.e. the increase of consumers' and 
producers' surplus in the two countries due to the international trading. 
When excess supply/demand functions are used, W, the "artificial" welfare function, may be 
defined as: 
(28)  W = t· [ - x·(x·) ] - t·· [ (t  .. + "If .. - u .. ) x .. ] 
1  1  1  IJ"1J  IJ  IJ  IJ  ' 
where Xi(xi) denotes the integral under the inverse excess supply/demand function of region i, 
In Figure 2 the gains from trade of regions A and B are given by the sum of the areas CDP  a 
and PbGF.  These may be obtained by subtracting from the area CDOXa the areas FGXbO and 
CP  aPbE.  This is exactly what is given, for the n countries case, by expression (28).  Xi with the 
minus sign in front of it, in fact, gives, for each region, the area under the excess supply/demand 
function, positive if the region is importing (xi<O), negative if it is exporting (xi>O). From the 
quantity computed in this way, the net gains from trade are obtained by subtracting the 
transportation costs plus the tariff revenues minus the subsidy expenditure (the algebraic sum of 
tariff, subsidy and transportation costs is given in Figure 2 by the area CP  aPbE). 
When excess demand/supply functions are used, arbitraging cannot be constrained any more 
to not exceed domestic consumption.
14 
The problem may now be stated as: 
(29) max  W 
~j 21 
price  s. 
G 
F 
x.  o  quantity 
Figure  2  •  Two  country  world  trade equilibrium. 22 
subject to: 
(30) t?  {[1 - (trl)/-2] tj Xji + [(ti-l)/-2] tj Xij  } = 0  , i= 1, .. , n; 
(31) xi = tj Xij - tj Xji  ' i= 1, .. , n; 
(32)  Xij  ~  0  ;  i, j= 1, .. , n. 
Equilibrium prices and individual countries gains from trade may now be computed as: 
(33) Pi = Pi(xi*)'  i= 1, ... , n; 
(34) Wi = [Pi(xi*) xt] - Xi(xi*) + tj (1I'ji Xji*) , i= 1, .. , n. 
Two Numerical Examples 
In this section two simple numerical examples -- one addressing some of the trade policy 
issues of the 1980 US embargo on USSR, the other, constructed, involving preferential trading -- are 
presented to show how the proposed model works and how its results compare with those which 
may be obtained using the other spatial trade models discussed. 
(a) The 1980 US embargo to the USSR; 
The trade policy option analyzed in the fIrst numerical example is an embargo.  The focus is 
on the 1980 US embargo to the USSR.  It lasted from January 4,  1980 to April 24, 1981 and 
covered several agricultural products, including wheat, feed grains, soybeans, meat and dairy 
products.  The embargo was only partial, because the US fulfilled its commitment to the 1975 US-
USSR trade agreement allowing the export to USSR of 8 million tons of grains in 1979/80 and 
1980/81. 
The embargo was motivated solely on the basis of a foreign policy concern, as a retaliation to 
protest the "USSR invasion of Afghanistan."  The decision was taken on the basis of a Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate that the embargo would have had a very strong impact on meat 
consumption in USSR (USDA).  The CIA estimate assumed full cooperation of all other exporters. 
The actual short run impact of the embargo was substantially smaller than expected.  It had a very 
small impact, if any, on meat consumption in the USSR.  The USSR strategy was essentially based 23 
on: (a) replacing imports from the US  by increased imports from other sources, (b) increasing 
imports of substitute goods, and (c) slightly reducing its stocks. 
Even if the exercise performed provides some interesting insights with respect to the trade 
policy issues involved, assessing the actual effectiveness of the 1980 embargo is by no means the 
goal of this section.  Its goal, instead, is to show, by using the model presented to predict the 
possible effects of an embargo, how very useful indications may be obtained on its possible different 
outcomes as a function of different scenarios with respect to the cooperation of the other actors 
active in the market. 
The main source, both for background information and input data, is the comprehensive study 
mandated by the U.S. Congress (USDA).  Consistent with the approach followed so far, only one 
commodity (wheat) is taken into account in a partial equilibrium framework.  27 regions are 
considered.  Excess supply/demand functions (Table AI) are derived from base net trade positions, 
prices and trade elasticities used in USDA.  The model is a short run model in nature, i.e. production 
is held fixed and only consumption, stocks and trade flows are assumed to change as a function of 
changes in prices.  The reference time framework is the calendar year 1980, the only case where the 
embargo was in place for the entire year.  Domestic policies as well as border ones have been 
incorporated by including price transmission elasticities in the computation of the trade price 
elasticities (USDA).  The transportation costs matrix used is given in Table A2.  It expands on the 
one used by Holland and Sharples. 
The problem at hand is assumed to be that of an a priori evaluation of what the effects of a 
zero constraint on wheat exports from the US to USSR would be.  Hence, the base scenario is the 
one in which no constraints exist on the trade flows.  This solution is then compared with 5 different 
scenarios in which the embargo is active and different hypotheses regarding the cooperation of the 
other countries are assumed.  In the first one it is assumed that no country cooperates, i.e. the only 
constraint imposed is the zero constraint on the US-USSR trade flow.  The second scenario assumes 
that Canada, the European Community, Oceania and Argentina, i.e. all the other exporters in the 24 
base scenario, agree not to increase their exports to the USSR above the pre-embargo levels. 
Importers, however, are left free to arbitrage.  In the third scenario all countries are cooperating, i.e. 
exporters agree not to increase their exports to the USSR, and importers agree not to arbitrage.  The 
fourth andfifth scenario differ from the second and the third, respectively, only for the fact that 
Argentina is now assumed not to cooperate  (In 1980 Canada, the European Community and 
Oceania agreed not to increase their exports to the USSR, even if their actual level of cooperation 
remains questionable, while Argentina announced that it was not going to cooperate). 
Information about the trade flows and the net trade positions in the base solution is given in 
Table 3.  In the pre-embargo scenario the US exports 33.7 million tons of wheat, and exports to the 
USSR equal 5.3 million tons.  The other net exporters are Canada (17.5 million tons), the European 
Community (9.1), Oceania (12.2) and Argentina (4.9).  Major importers are Japan (5.7 million tons), 
East Europe (5.4) USSR (14.4), China (12.2), Egypt (5.3) and Middle East (5.3). 
Thefirst embargo scenario assumes (a) that the US stops its exports to the USSR, and (b) that 
other countries do not cooperate (Table 4).  When this is the case the impact of the embargo on the 
27 regions net trade positions is negligible. IS  USSR wheat imports from US are replaced by 
increased imports from Canada and, as a result, USSR total wheat imports decline only by 59 
thousand tons.  The US, in turn, made up for the embargo on its exports to USSR by (a) increasing 
its exports toward regions they were already exporting to, and (b) exporting 2 million tons to East 
Europe and half a million tons to Egypt, two regions it was not trading with in the base scenario. 
Essentially, if the US imposes the embargo without obtaining any cooperation at all from the other 
actors active in the market its policy results in a complete failure.  Trade net positions remain 
unchanged, and only some marginal welfare losses are experienced as a function of increased 
transportation costs due to the changes in the trade flows. 
In the second scenario the US  embargo receives full cooperation from all the regions 
exporting in the base solution (Canada, EC, Argentina and Oceania).  They agree not to increase 
their exports to USSR above the base solution levels.  Importers are assumed not to cooperate, Table 3  - The embargo example. 
Base solution. 
Trade flows and net trade positions (million tons). 
Source 
Destination  US  Canada  EC  Oceania  Argentina 
Oth. West. Eur.  1.755 
Japan  5.698 
South Africa  .011  , 
East Europe  5.351 
USSR  5.282  9.090 
China  9.395  2.792 
Mexico  .793 
Central America  2.129 
Brazil  4.786 
Venezuela  .744 
South America  3.119 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.007  .297 
Nigeria  .495  .510 
Egypt  .554  4.729 
North Africa  4.381 
India  .067 
South Asia  2.748 
Indonesia  1.505 
Thailand  .177 
South-East Asia  1.345 
East Asia  2.421 
Middle East  5.275 


























25 Table 4  - The embargo example. 
Scenario #1 (embargo active, no country cooperating). 
Trade flows and net trade positions (million tons). 
Source 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Destination  US  Canada  EC  Oceania  Argentina 
Oth. West. Eur.  1.758 
Japan  5.698 
South Africa  .011 
East Europe  2.073  3.255 
USSR  14.314 
China  11.941  .264 
Mexico  .796 
Central America  2.130 
Brazil  4.787 
Venezuela  .744 
South America  3.122 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.306 
Nigeria  1.006 
Egypt  .532  4.746 
North Africa  4.373 
India  .068 
South Asia  2.024  .727 
Indonesia  1.506 
Thailand  .177 
South-East Asia  .485  .862 
East Asia  2.423 
Middle East  5.284 


























- 5.284 27 
which means that they are left free to arbitrage.  This scenario actually seems to be very close to the 
one the US was trying to reach in 1980.  However, the results of  our simulations (Table 5) show that 
obtaining exporters cooperation is not enough to guarantee that effective results will be reached.  In 
fact, USSR wheat imports are now predicted to decrease only by 400 thousand tons, a fall which 
cannot be expected to create any significant change in food availability in that country.  USSR 
import price, on the other hand, goes up by 10.48 dollars due to the increased transportation costs 
(Table 9).  USSR is able to substitute for its imports from the US thanks to arbitrage.  It imports 3 
and 1.8 million tons from East Europe and from the non EC western european countries, 
respectively.  Both regions are net importers and arbitrage increased exports from the US  (East 
Europe) and from Canada (Other West Europe).  US exports decrease only by 272 thousand tons, 
while the price falls by 1.32 dollars. World wheat trade falls only by 271 thousand tons (Table 10). 
Hence, our simulation suggests that, even if the US would have obtained the cooperation requested 
to the other exporters, this would not have been sufficient to assure a significant impact of the 
embargo due to arbitraging.  Arbitraging, however, does not seem to have been considered as a 
relevant issue during the policy design and implementation. 
The third scenario (Table 6) has all countries cooperate, exporting countries by having their 
exports to USSR not exceeding the pre-embargo levels, importing countries by not arbitraging.  The 
embargo impact is now significant.  USSR wheat imports equal only 9.090 million tons, 5.3 million 
tons below the pre-embargo level.  If  we assume that Canada, which is the only country exporting to 
USSR, does not exploit market power, then USSR import price is now 13.49 dollars lower than the 
pre embargo one.  US exports decrease by 2.8 million tons, export price by 13.69 dollars.  World 
wheat trade decreases by 3.7 million tons.  It should be noted that the US is not the only region 
paying a price for the US embargo.  Canada's exports fall by almost 600 thousand tons and its 
export price by 13.49 US dollars.  EC, Argentina and Oceania all experience lower exports and Table 5  - The embargo example. 
Scenario #2 (embargo active, all exporters cooperating). 
Trade flows and net trade positions (million tons). 
Source 
Destination  US  Canada  EC  Oceania  Argentina  East Eur.  O.W.Eur. 
Oth. West. Eur.  3.594 
Japan  5.699 
South Africa  .011 
East Europe  8.421 
USSR  9.090  3.074  1.832 
China  12.000  .228 
Mexico  .799 
Central America  2.131 
Brazil  4.789 
Venezuela  .745 
South America  3.126 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.308 
Nigeria  1.006 
Egypt  .548  4.734 
North Africa  4.379 
India  .069 
South Asia  1.174  1.584 
Indonesia  1.508 
Thailand  .177 
South-East Asia  1.348 
East Asia  2.426 
Middle East  5.295 



























00 Table 6  - The embargo example. 
Scenario #3 (embargo active, all countries cooperating). 
Trade flows and net trade positions (million tons). 
Source 
Destination  US  Canada  EC  Oceania  Argentina 
Oth. West. Eur.  1.827 
Japan  5.713 
South Africa  .013 
East Europe  5.547 
USSR  9.090 
China  11.575  1.043 
Mexico  .850 
Central America  2.146 
Brazil  4.818 
Venezuela  .762 
South America  3.184 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.412  .928 
Nigeria  .015  .993 
Egypt  5.345 
North Africa  .843  3.651 
India  .083 
South Asia  1.310  1.553 
Indonesia  1.531 
Thailand  .180 
South-East Asia  1.381 
East Asia  2.480 
Middle East  5.480 



























prices.  This is because of the increased competition from US exports they now face in their 
traditional markets.16 
The fourth andfifth scenarios (Tables 7 and 8) show that the fact that Argentina stated 
explicitly that it was not going to cooperate was on its own a sufficient condition to make the US 
effort hopeless, no matter what the degree of cooperation of the other countries was.  In fact, when 
all the exporters but Argentina are constrained to export to the USSR volumes not exceeding the 
pre-embargo levels, the impact of the embargo is very small.  USSR imports decline only by 371 
thousand tons when arbitraging is allowed (and some arbitrage occurs), and by 382 thousand tons 
when importing countries are assumed to fully cooperate (Table 10). 
The third scenario, the one with all exporters cooperating and no arbitraging taking place is 
likely to be what the CIA had in mind when suggesting a strong embargo impact.  The fourth 
scenario, on the other hand, the one in which arbitraging is left free to occur, Canada, Oceania and 
the EC keep their exports at the pre-embargo levels and Argentina does not cooperate, seems to 
represent the setting closest to the actual outcome. 
If a model which defined the importing and the exporting regions a priori, or if a QP or a VS 
model would have been used, it would have been impossible to assess the impact of the embargo 
under different level of cooperation of the importing regions.  The model proposed, on the contrary, 
provides the opportunity of easily incorporating different assumptions regarding arbitraging, 
allowing for a comparison of the different possible outcomes as a function of different hypotheses 
about the trade behavior of the countries involved. 
If  a policy conclusion can be reached on the basis of the exercise which has been conducted, it 
is that embargoes are policy tools that are very likely not to work.  In order to have the embargo 
being effective one of the two following conditions must hold: (a) all countries cooperate (exporters 
by freezing their exports to the target country, importers by not arbitraging), or (b) all exporters 
agree to freeze at the pre-embargo levels their exports not only to the target country but to all 
importing regions.  Both conditions appear to be very difficult to achieve. Table 7  -
Destination 







The embargo example. 
Scenario #4 (embargo active, all exporters but Argentina cooperating). 
Trade flows and net trade positions (million tons). 
Source  Net 
Trade 
US  Canada  EC  Oceania Argentina  O.W.Eur.  Positions 
2.008  - 1.763 
5.699  - 5.699 
.011  - .011 
5.347  - 5.347 
9.090  4.668  .244  - 14.002 
12.234  - 12.234 
.800  -.800 
Central America  2.131  - 2.131 
Brazil  4.789  - 4.789 
Venezuela  .746  - .746 
South America  3.126  - 3.126 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.146  .158  - 2.304 
Nigeria  .929  .077  - 1.005 
Egypt  5.282  - 5.282 
North Africa  .552  3.829  - 4.380 
India  .067  - .067 
South Asia  2.748  - 2.748 
Indonesia  1.506  - 1.506 
Thailand  .177  -.177 
South-East Asia  1.345  - 1.345 
East Asia  2.422  - 2.422 
Middle East  1.308  3.970  - 5.278 
Net Trade Posit.  33.392  17.511  9.111  12.247  4.903  - 1.763 
31 Table 8  - The embargo example. 
Scenario #5 (embargo active. all countries but Argentina cooperating). 
Trade flows and net trade positions (million tons). 
Source  Net 
------------------------------------------------------------- Trade 
Destination  US  Canada  EC  Oceania  Argentina  Positions 
Oth. West. Eur.  1.764  - 1.764 
Japan  5.699  - 5.699 
South Africa  .011  - .011 
East Europe  .214  5.128  - 5.342 
USSR  9.090  4.901  - 13.991 
China  12.237  - 12.237 
Mexico  .800  -.800 
Central America  2.131  - 2.131 
Brazil  4.789  - 4.789 
Venezuela  .746  - .746 
South America  3.127  - 3.127 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.303  - 2.303 
Nigeria  1.003  .002  - 1.005 
Egypt  5.283  - 5.283 
North Africa  .554  3.827  - 4.381 
India  .067  - .067 
South Asia  2.749  - 2.749 
Indonesia  1.506  - 1.506 
Thailand  .177  - .177 
South-East Asia  1.346  - 1.346 
East Asia  1.312  1.110  - 2.422 
Middle East  5.279  - 5.279 
Net Trade Positions  33.373  17.525  9.110  12.246  4.904 
32 33 
Table 9  - The embargo example. 
Changes in import and export prices as a consequence of the imposition 
of the embargo (US $ per ton). 
Base  Scenarios 
solution  ------------------------------------------------------------
1  2  3  4  5 
US  163.28  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Canada  165.28  + 1.62  +  .28  - 13.49*  +  .30  +  .60 
Ee  177.18  + 1.02  +  .28  -13.49  - .10  .00 
Oth. W. Eur.  179.88  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Japan  179.88  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Oceania  166.98  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 
South Africa  192.78  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 
East Europe  181.28  + 1.62  +  .28  - 13.49  +  .30  .  +  .60 
USSR  183.08  + 1.62  + 10.48  - 13.49*  + 10.30  +10.60 
China  192.18  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Mexico  177.08  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Central Amer.  177.08  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Brazil  178.28  - .58  -1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Argentina  167.98  - .38  - 1.12  - 13.49  - .30  +  .60 
Venezuela  179.78  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
South Amer.  179.78  - .58  -1.32  - 13.69  - 1.50  - 1.60 
Sub-Sah. Afr.  196.48  - .38  - 1.12  - 13.49  +  .30  +  .60 
Nigeria  196.48  - .38  - 1.12  - 13.49  +  .30  +  .60 
Egypt  191.78  + 1.02  +  .28  - 13.49  - .10  .00 
North Africa  191.78  + 1.02  +  .28  - 13.49  - .10  .00 
India  196.98  - .58  -1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 
South Asia  194.78  - .38  - 1.12  - 13.49  .00  - .10 
Indonesia  190.18  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 
Thailand  188.18  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 
South E. Asia  194.78  - .58  - 1.22  - 13.49  .00  - .10 
East Asia  190.18  - .58  -1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 
Middle East  189.98  - .58  - 1.32  - 13.69  - .20  - .30 





























The embargo example. 
Changes· in net trade positions as a consequence of the imposition 







































1  2 
120  -272 
71  + 31 
9  +  3 
3  - 7 
0  1 
5  - 12 
0  0 
23  +  4 
59  +407 
18  - 41 
3  6 
1  2 
1  3 
1  3 
0  1 
3  - 7 
1  3 
0  0 
5  +  1 
8  +  2 
1  2 
4  - 10 
1  3 
0  0 
2  3 
2  5 
9  - 20 
44  -271 
Scenarios 
3  4  5 
- 2,832  -310  -329 
591  +13  +  25 
114  +  1  0 
72  8  9 
15  1  1 
128  1  2 
2  0  0 
+  4  +  4  +  9 
+ 5,283  +371  +382 
431  - 47  - 50 
57  - 7  7 
17  2  2 
28  3  3 
45  2  +  3 
18  2  2 
65  - 7  8 
35  +  1  +  2 
2  +  1  +  1 
62  1  0 
113  +  1  0 
16  0  0 
115  0  1 
26  1  1 
3  0  0 
36  0  1 
59  1  1 
205  3  4 
- 3,710  -299  -303 
*.  note that for an importing country a positive change of its net trade poSition implies a reduction 
of its imports, while the opposite is true if a negative change occurs. 
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A last point to be made is that if all exporters agree to cooperate, they come out sharing part 
of the cost of the embargo, because the embargo imposing country's exports will now displace part 
of their pre-embargo exports.  This implies that asking for cooperation in an embargo scheme should 
be supported by either a reimbursement for the costs, or by the guarantee that the embargo imposing 
country's exports would not exceed the pre-embargo level minus the volume exported to the country 
the embargo is imposed on. 
(b) Assessing the impact of  a preferential tariff; 
The second case. considered, while hypothetical, is representative of an increasingly prevalent 
policy of developed countries which provide preferential access to developing countries imports. 
Six countries are considered.  Countries A and B may be thought of as developed countries 
with high production costs, country C as a developed country with low production costs and 
countries 0, E and F as developing countries with different costs of production.  Country A is 
strongly interested, for general foreign policy reasons, to have the developing countries as allies (in 
particular it is interested in keeping a good relationship with country 0, which is hosting military 
installations crucial for its security).  On the other hand, country A strongly opposes country C. 
Each country's domestic demand and supply and inverse excess demand/supply functions are 
given in Table A3 in Appendix.  Even though the proposed model does not need demand and supply 
schedules to be linear, they are assumed to be linear in the example.  This allows for a comparison 
of the results obtained by using the model proposed in the previous section with those obtained 
using the QP model. 
In the starting scenario, countries A and B impose a non-discriminatory import tariff.  The 
hypothetical policy issue to be addressed is the impact of country A granting tariff-free access to 
exports from countries 0, E and F (the developing countries), while imposing a discriminatory tariff 
(left unchanged) on its imports from countries Band C. Transportation costs and per unit import 
tariffs are given in Table A4 in Appendix.  When preferential tariffs are in place the generalized 
transportation costs matrix is no longer consistent.  The minimum generalized cost path to ship one 36 
unit of the commodity from country C to country A is no longer the direct one (the generalized 
transportation cost associated with this path is equal to tca + 1f ca = 1 + 2 = 3), but the path going 
from C to F and from F to A (the generalized transportation cost now being tcf + 11' cf + tra + 11' fa = .5 
+ 0 + 1 + 0 = 1.5) . 
In the starting scenario countries A, B, E and. F are importing, C and D are exporting (Table 
11).  Because the generalized transportation costs matrix is consistent, this solution may be obtained 
using any of the four classes of models considered. 
However, when the hypothetical preferential trade policy option is taken into account, the 
projected scenario crucially depends on the model used (and on the assumptions it implicitly makes 
about arbitragfug). 
The first solution considered is the one obtained using the Qp17  and the VS 18  models based 
on domestic demand and supply functions, and the model presented in this paper setting 
fA BCD E F =  \II ABC =  0, and \liD E F =  1.  All of them assume, implicitly or explicitly, that 
""'"  " 
arbitraging is allowed but constrained not to exceed domestic consumption.  Country A's production 
decreases sharply.  Domestic production is replaced by increased imports from D (which more than 
doubles its exports to A) (Table 12).  Country E is slightly worse off.  It does not trade in the 
preferential trading scenario, while it was importing in the starting one (Table 11).  Country F is 
made better off by the preference granted by country A.  It was importing in the non-discriminatory 
tariff scenario, and it is exporting in the preferential trade policy one.  This switch from being an 
importer to being an exporter as a result of  country A's policy change would not have been caught if 
a model setting a priori the positions of the countries on the market would have been used.  Country 
C is strongly penalized, even if the nominal level of the tariff faced by its exports to A did not 
change.  The QP and VS models implicitly constrain each country's arbitraging to not exceed 
domestic consumption.  The model proposed here is explicitly constrained in the same way. 
Country C now ships to A both directly and, indirectly, through F, which is arbitraging, partially 
bypassing country A's discriminatory tariff.  Country F's constraint on arbitraging is binding.  Its Table 11 - The preferential tariff example.  Production, consumption, volume traded, 
prices and welfare. 
Consumption  Production  Net trade  Demand  Supply  Welfare 
position  price  price 
Base solution (non discriminatory tariff). 
A  293.556  154.648  138.908  8.444  8.444  43,864 
B  16.056  13.944  2.112  8.944  8.944  218 
C  2.278  113.369  111.090  5.444  5.444  267 
0  3.686  35.140  31.455  3.944  3.944  39 
E  3.057  2.944  0.113  4.944  4.944  9 
F  12.478  11.066  1.412  5.944  5.944  1,559 
Solution obtained using the Quadratic Programming and the Vector Sandwich models based on 
domestic demand and supply functions, and the model proposed (constraining arbitraging 
not to exceed domestic consumption). 
A  294.501  131.980  - 162.520  7.499  7.499  43,870 
B  17.001  12.999  4.002  7.999  7.999  225 
C  2.750  90.230  87.478  4.499  4.499  174 
0  3.334  69.973  66.639  4.999  4.999  91 
E  3.000  3.000  0.000  5.000  5.000  9 
F  12.525  24.929  12.404  4.999  6.499  1,581 
Solution obtained using the Quadratic Programming model based on excess demand and supply functions 
and the model proposed (leaving arbitraging unconstrained). 
A  294.868  123.157  171.711  7.132  7.132  43,790 
B  15.868  14.131  1.737  9.132  9.132  217 
C  2.184  117.970  115.786  5.632  5.632  288 
0  3.456  57.833  54.377  4.632  4.632  69 
E  3.000  3.000  0.000  5.000  5.000  9 
F  12.468  15.753  3.285  6.132  6.132  1,560 
_  .. _-------------------......... _--------------------... -----------------------------------------_  .. _  ... _---------------------------------
Solution obtained using the model proposed when no arbitraging can occur. 
Scenario #2 (0 and E allowed to export, F allowed to import). 
A  294.215  138.827  - 155.389  7.785 
B  16.715  13.284  3.431  8.285 
C  2.608  97.220  94.612  4.785 
0  3.238  79.389  76.150  5.285 
E  2.716  3.284  0.569  5.284 
F  12.511  0.000  12.511  5.283 
Solution obtained using the model proposed when no arbitraging can occur. 
Scenario #4 (0 allowed to export, E and F allowed to import). 
A  294.208  138.987  155.221  7.792 
B  16.709  13.291  3.418  8.291 
C  2.604  97.382  94.778  4.791 
0  3.236  79.382  76.371  5.291 
E  3.000  3.000  0.000  5.000 
F  12.510  0.000  12.510  5.291 
7.785  43,840 
8.285  222 
4.785  200 
5.285  111 
5.284  9 
5.500  1,565 
7.792  43,839 
8.291  222 
4.791  200 
5.291  112 
5.000  9 
5.500  1,565 
37 Table 12 - The preferential tariff example. Trade flows. 
Destination 
Source 
A  B  C  0  E  F 
Base solution (non discriminatory tariff). 
A  154.648 
B  13.944 
C  107.566  2.112  2.278  1.412 
0  31.342  3.686  0.113 
E  2.944 
F  11.066 
Solution obtained using the Quadratic Programming and the Vector sandwich models 
based on domestic demand and supply functions. and the model proposed (constraining 
arbitraging not to exceed domestic consumption). 
A  131.980 
B  12.999 
C  70.953  4.002  2.750  12.525 
0  66.639  3.334 
E  3.000 
F  24.929 
Solution obtained using the Quadratic Programming model based on excess demand and 
supply functions and the model proposed (leaving arbitraging unconstrained). 
A  123.157 
B  14.131 
C  1.737  2.184 
0  54.377  3.456 
E  3.000 
F  117.334 
Solution obtained using the model proposed when no arbitraging can occur. 
Scenario #2 (0 and E allowed to export, F allowed to import). 
A  138.827 
B  13.284 
C  78.670  3.431  2.608 
0  76.150  3.238 
E  0.569  2.716 
F 
Solution obtained using the model proposed when no arbitraging can occur. 



















consumers pay 4.999 for one unit of the commodity, while its producers receive 6.499 for each unit 
shipped.  Expons equal domestic production and impons equal domestic consumption. 
The third solution presented is the one obtained when the QP model based on excess 
supply/demand functions and the model presented here, with both the ti's and 1IIi's parameters set 
equal to 0, are used.  Now arbitraging is left completely unconstrained.  All of country C's exports 
to A now go through F, completely bypassing country A's impon tariff (Table 12).  Country C, 
which country A opposes, is now even better off with respect to the non discriminatory trade 
scenario!  Country D's expons to A fall.  Countries D and F are worse off with respect to the 
solution which allowed a constrained arbitraging, while country E's welfare is not affected (Table 
11). 
The use of the model proposed in this paper when arbitraging is not allowed implies the 
solution of 8 different models corresponding to the 23 possible sets of the t i'  s parameters. 
Individual and joint beneficiary countries' welfares associated to each of the 8 solutions are 
given in Table 13. 
If the preferred countries do not collude, but each of them tries to maximize its own gains 
from trade, the only equilibrium in this hypothetical example is the one labeled as scenario number 
2.  In this scenario, no beneficiary country would gain from moving to the other side of the market. 
In addition, if each of the remaining 7 scenarios is considered, it is easy to verify that if countries D, 
E and F change their position on the market trying to maximize their gains from trade, then they 
always eventually move to scenario number 2.  Hence, in this panicular case, the solution suggested 
by the model when it is assumed that no arbitraging can take place is unique and stable.  In this 
solution (Table 11), countries D and E expon.  Country F, which is constrained not to export, is an 
importer.  It does not produce at all.  Its domestic consumption is entirely satisfied by imports at a 
price lower than the minimum price needed to have a positive domestic supply. 
If the preferred countries collude, the solution is given by scenario number 4.  This particular 
case - in which country D exports, country F imports (and, again, finds unprofitable to produce) and 40 
Table 13  - The preferential tariff example. 
Solutions obtained using the model proposed when no arbitraging can occur. 
Welfare results. 
Scenario #  ~D  ~E ~F  WD  WE  WF  WD+WE+WF 
1  1  1  1  90.810  9.000  1,562.483  1,662.293 
2  1  1  -1  111.225  9.081  1,565.215  1,685.521 
3  1  -1  1  90.811  9.000  1,562.476  1,662.287 
4  1  -1  -1  111.730  9.000  1,565.108  1,685.838 
5  -1  1  1  24.242  9.708  1,581.881  1,615.831 
6  -1  1  -1  24.243  11.140  1,559.371  1,594.754 
7  -1  -1  1  24.241  8.998  1,582.618  1,615.857 
8  -1  -1  -1  24.292  9.000  1,559.376  1,592.668 
Table 14  - The preferential tariff example. 
Welfare impact of country A implementing the preferential trade policy. 
Constrained  Free  ------ No arbitraging ------
arbitraging  arbitraging  (a)  (b) 
WA  +  0.01%  0.17%  0.06%  0.06% 
WB  +  3.21%  0.54%  +  1.83%  +  2.29% 
Wc  34.82%  +  7.86%  - 25.09%  - 25.09% 
WD  +  133.33%  +  76.92%  +  184.62% 
WE  0.06%  0.06%  0.06% 
WF  +  1.41%  +  0.06%  +  0.38% 
WD+WE+WF  +  4.60%  +  1.93%  +  4.85%  +  4.92% 
llW  A 
0.08  2.39  0.31  0.32  + 
Il(WD+WE+WF) 
(a): beneficiary countries not colluding (scenario #2); 
(b): beneficiary countries colluding (scenario #4). 41 
country E does not trade - is associated with the highest possible level of the sum of the gains from 
trade of the three colluding beneficiary countries (Table l3).  Country D compensates countries E 
and P in such a way that they are better off with respect to the gains from trade that they would 
obtain trying to maximize their own gains from trade individually. 
Table 14 synthesizes the estimates of the welfare impact of country A's preferential trade 
policy option obtained by using the different models.  The most relevant differences concern 
countries D and C (respectively the country A is more interested in favoring, and the country A 
opposes).  When arbitraging is implicitly (QP model·s based on excess demand and supply 
functions) or explicitly left free to occur, country C's welfare is actually increased by country A 
granting preferential market access to its imports from D, E and P.  Country D's welfare is the 
lowest among those reachable under the different hypotheses made regarding arbitraging.  When 
arbitraging is implicitly (QP model based on domestic supplies and demands, VS  model) or 
explicitly constrained to not exceed domestic consumption, country C is strongly negatively affected 
by country A's policy, while country D strongly benefits from it.  When arbitraging is not allowed, 
the beneficiary countries experience the highest welfare increase.  Country C is negatively affected, 
but less than under the hypothesis that a constrained arbitraging can take place. 
In addition, if the efficiency (from country A's viewpoint) of the welfare transfer induced by 
the donor preferential tariff is considered, the results are very different.  In Table 14 the ratio 
between the change in country A's welfare and the change in the sum of the beneficiary countries' 
welfares [f1W Alf1(WD+WE+Wp)] for each of the scenarios considered is given.  This ratio is an 
index of the efficiency of the transfer (it is equal to the number of units of welfare country A is 
giving up to induce a one unit increase in the sum of the beneficiary countries' welfares).  When 
constrained arbitraging can take place country A slightly increases its welfare while making the 
beneficiary countries better off.  When arbitraging is left free to occur, not only the smallest 
beneficiary countries welfare increase takes place, but the efficiency ratio is much smaller than -1  (it 
is, in fact, equal to -2.39), i.e. A would be much better off by inducing the same welfare increase in 42 
countries D, E and F through a direct resources transfer (which, under the assumptions made, would 
have an efficiency ratio equal to -1).  On the contrary, when arbitraging cannot take place, the 
beneficiary countries' welfare reaches its highest value and the efficiency ratio is close to -.30, i.e. 
country A's welfare is decreasing only by three tenths of one unit for each unit increase in the sum 
of countries D, E and F welfares. 
As discussed before, arbitraging is definitely an issue in real world preferential trading. 
Clearly, the hypotheses regarding arbitraging (or, more often, the apparently "neutral" choice among 
alternative models thought to be equivalent) may produce very different projections of the effects of 
the trade policy option considered.  In this second example the results of the analysis show that 
failure by country A to prevent the possibility of arbitraging occurring may turn the preferential 
trade policy in a very inefficient and costly option.  The model which has been proposed gives the 
option of investigating the impact of the policy under a full spectrum of different trade behavior 
assumptions regarding arbitraging.  This option is neglected when QP, NLP or VS models are used. 
The hypotheses that have been made about the behavior of the beneficiary countries are very 
simple.  Much more complex game structures in the international trade context are available and can 
be adapted to the specific problems discussed here. 
Conclusions 
Arbitraging is definitely an issue in real world discriminatory trade policy design and 
implementation, as confirmed, for example,  by the "rules of origin" attached to all the active 
preferential tariff agreements.  In this paper the limits involved in using Quadratic Programming, 
Non Linear Programming as proposed by Rowse, and Vector Sandwich models when discriminatory 
trade policies are present have been discussed.  It has been shown that all these models implicitly 
make strong assumptions regarding the possibility of arbitraging to occur.  In addition, the non-
equivalence of the Takayama and Judge models based on domestic demand and supply functions 
and on excess demand/supply functions when discriminatory trade policies are present has been 
addressed. 43 
A framework designed to model policy scenarios when discriminatory policies are active, 
allowing (a) each country to move from one side of the market to the other as the equilibrium prices 
change, and (b) the researcher to impose her assumptions about the possibility of arbitraging to 
occur and about countries' behavior, has been proposed. 
Two numerical examples have been used to show how relevant the proposed model's features 
may be in terms of the implications for agricultural trade policy analysis. 
Even if arbitraging is definitely a serious concern in designing and managing real world 
discriminatory trade policies, the most popular spatial trade models fail to effectively take it into 
account.  The model proposed allows the researcher to properly specify his own assumptions about 
arbitraging and/or to obtain different possible solutions as a function of different policy constraints 
or different levels of effectiveness in enforcing such constraints. 
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Footnotes 
*.  The authors wish to thank Mary Bohman, Fabrizio De Filippis, Tu Jarvis, Ila Temu and Quirino 
Paris for their many valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
1:  Third ACP-EEC Convention, signed in Lome', Togo on December 8th 1984. 
2:  Throughout the paper arbitraging is defined in a broad sense as countries exporting and 
importing at the same time, without implying the existence of arbitraging gains. 
3:  I.e. pairs (i, j) and G, i) are different. 
4:  The structure of the problem somehow resemble that of a generalized transportation model in 
which transshipment in pennitted (as in Dantzig, chpt. 16).  There, however, linear 
transportation costs are minimized, here the optimization involves a non-linear objective 
function. 
5:  "In this example we use the same demand and supply functions and transportation costs as in 
chapters 7 and 8, but assume that 11'21=1 and 11'31 =1. It is not necessary to assume that 
lflj=1f2r  ... =lfnj for allj;  that is, the tariff may be discriminatory," (Takayama and Judge 1971, 46 
p.201). 
6:  The equivalence of the price and the quantity fonnulations of the model is proven in Takayama 
and Woodland. 
7:  The analogous conditions for the price fonnulation of the model are given in (S.3.7.a) and 
(S.3.7.b), p.  159. 
S:  For a complete description of the structure of this model see Takayama and Judge 1971, chpt. 
10. 
9:  Non linear transportation costs may be included as well.  However, to keep the model 
presentation as close as possible to the QP framework discussed above, linear transportation 
costs are assumed.  This does not affect anyhow the results of the analysis. 
10:  A good introduction to fIxed point theory as a tool in fInding economic eqUilibrium solutions is 
Zangwill and Garcia, chptso 5, 6 and 7. 
11:  Non linear transportation costs may be easily included.  They are assumed to be linear to 
maintain the discussion as close as possible to the standard QP setting. 
12:  The consumers price if consumers and producers prices are not equal. 
13:  The producers price if consumers and producers prices are not equal. 
14:  However, in this fonnulation of the problem, as well as in the one based on domestic demand 
and supply functions, each country's arbitraging may be easily constrained not to exceed a 
specifIc amount by inserting an ad hoc constraint. 
15:  A summary of the impact of the embargo in the different scenarios is given in Tables 9 and 10. 
16:  The same argument is in Paddock. 
17:  Clearly, in this case the NLP fonnulation collapse to the QP one. 
IS:  The VS solution has been obtained by specifying in Holland's program the generalized 
transportation costs matrix as if it was the transportation costs one. 47 
Appendix 
Table Al  - The embargo example. 
Excess demand/supply functions. 
(prices in US $ per ton; quantities in million tons) 
US  P  =  0.349  +  4.834  q 
Canada  p  =  - 233.871  +  22.811  q 
EC  P  =  - 898.258  +  118.046  q 
Oth. West. Eur.  p  =  518.015  +  192.622  q 
Japan  p  =  5450.136  +  924.969  q 
Oceania  p  = -1134.499  +  106.256  q 
South Africa  p  =  267.002  +  6700.168  q 
East Europe  p  =  550.109  +  68.928  q 
USSR  P  =  582.966  +  27.823  q 
China  p  =  579.342  +  31.769  q 
Mexico  p  =  369.280  +  242.269  q 
Central America  p  =  1945.634  +  830.684  q 
Brazil  p  =  2493.845  +  483.827  q 
Argentina  p  = -1275.145  +  294.427  q 
Venezuela  p  =  735.519  +  747.364  q 
South America  p  =  838.890  +  211.297  q 
Sub-Sah. Africa  p  =  1072.458  +  380.087  q 
Nigeria  p  =  5451.160  +  5225.823  q 
Egypt  P  =  1344.111  +  218.125  q 
North Africa  p  =  716.457  +  119.753  q 
India  p  =  254.311  +  854.092  q 
South Asia  p  =  518.286  +  117.706  q 
Indonesia  p  =  997.061  +  536.080  q 
Thailand  p  =  984.791  +  4495.407  q 
South East Asia  p  =  704.528  +  378.873  q 
East Asia  p  =  746.552  +  229.840  q 
Middle East  p  =  542.459  +  66.821  q Table A2  - The embargo example. 
US 
US  0 
CAN  10 
EC  16 
OWEU  16.6 
JAP  16.6 
aCE  32 
SAF  34.5 
EEUR  20.2 
USSR  19.8 
CHI  28.9 
MEX  13.8 
CAME  13.8 
BRA  15 
ARG  16.5 
YEN  16.5 
SAME  16.5 
SSAA  40 
NIG  40 
EGY  30.1 
NAFR  30.1 
IND  44.2 
SAS  44.2 
INDO  28.2 
THA  48.2 
SEAS  44.2 
EAS  28.2 
ME  28 
Transportation costs matrix. 
(US $ per ton) 
CAN  EC  OWEU  JAP 
10  16  16.6  16.6 
0  17  16.2  20.3 
17  0  12  26.8 
16.2  12  0  30 
20.3  26.8  30  0 
35  33.2  39.6  18.2 
35.4  35  35  20 
16  12.3  12.5  25 
17.8  15  15  26 
28.2  30  35  14 
19.3  20  25  18 
19.3  20  25  18 
21  20  25  24 
23  21.7  25  26.1 
23  21.7  25  26.1 
23  21.7  25  26.1 
31.2  31.6  30  24 
31.2  31.6  30  24 
26.5  14.6  15  28 
26.5  14.6  15  28 
37  39  39  30 
37  39  40  16 
26.6  30  35  13 
38.8  35.1  40  16 
37  39  40  15 
26.6  30  35  13 
26.4  28.8  34  18 





























SAF  EEUR  USSR  CHI  MEX  CAME  BRA  ARG  YEN 
34.5  20.2  19.8  28.9  13.8  13.8  15  16.5  16.5 
35.4  16  17.8  28.2  19.3  19.3  21  23  23 
35  12.3  15  30  20  20  20  21.7  21.7 
35  12.5  15  35  25  25  25  25  25 
20  25  26  14  18  18  24  26.1  26.1 
25.8  28  19.7  25.2  27.5  27.5  27.5  25.8  25.8 
0  35  35  30  34  34  33  32.1  32.1 
35  0  12  22  18  18  27  25.6  25.6 
35  12  0  20  25  25  25  25.1  26 
30  22  20  0  28  28  30  35.2  35.2 
34  18  25  28  0  12  25  25.1  25.1 
34  18  25  28  12  0  25  25.1  25.1 
33  27  25  30  25  25  0  15  15 
32.1  25.6  25.1  35.2  25.1  25.1  15  0  12 
32.1  25.6  26  35.2  25.1  25.1  15  12  0 
32.1  25.6  26  35.2  25.1  25.1  15  12  12 
20  30  30  30  40  40  30  28.5  28.5 
20  30  30  30  40  40  30  28.5  28.5 
25  18  16  35  35  35  28  27  27 
25  18  16  35  35  35  28  27  27 
28  30  39  30  40  40  44  44  44 
26  40  40  20  30  30  26  26.8  26.8 
30  40  35  18  35  35  30  34  34 
26  40  25  20  35  30  28  27.5  27.5 
30  40  40  18  35  35  30  26.8  26.8 
30  40  35  18  35  35  30  34  34 
29  40  34  25  34  34  29  33  33  +:>-
00 (Table A2. continued from the previous page) 
SAME  SSAA  NIG  EGY  NAFR  IND  SAS  INDO  THA  SEAS  EAS  ME 
US  16.5  40  40  30.1  30.1  44.2  44.2  28.2  48.2  44.2  28.2  28 
CAN  23  31.2  31.2  26.5  26.5  37  37  26.6  38.8  37  26.6  26.4 
EC  21.7  31.6  31.6  14.6  14.6  39  39  30  35.1  39  30  28.8 
OWEU  25  30  30  15  15  39  40  35  40  40  35  34 
JAP  26.1  24  24  28  28  30  16  13  16  15  13  18 
OCE  25.8  32.9  32.9  32.3  32.3  30  28  23.2  21.2  28  23.2  23 
SAF  32.1  20  20  25  25  28  26  30  26  30  30  29 
EEUR  25.6  30  30  18  18  30  40  40  40  40  40  40 
USSR  26  30  30  16  16  39  40  35  25  40  35  34 
CHI  35.2  30  30  35  35  30  20  18  20  18  18  25 
MEX  25.1  40  40  35  35  40  30  35  35  35  35  34 
CAME  25.1  40  40  35  35  40  30  35  30  35  35  34 
BRA  15  30  30  28  28  44  26  30  28  30  30  29 
ARG  12  28.5  28.5  27  27  44  26.8  34  27.5  26.8  34  33 
VEN  12  28.5  28.5  27  27  44  26.8  34  27.5  26.8  34  33 
SAME  0  28.5  28.5  27  27  44  26.8  34  27.5  26.8  34  33 
SSAH  28.5  0  12  20  20  30  30  36  36  36  36  35 
NIG  28.5  12  0  20  20  30  30  36  36  36  36  35 
EGY  27  20  20  0  12  35  20  28  25  27  28  27 
NAFR  27  20  20  12  0  35  20  28  25  27  28  27 
IND  44  30  30  35  35  0  12  25  25  25  25  25 
SAS  26.8  30  30  20  20  12  0  20  14  20  20  20 
INDO  34  36  36  28  28  25  20  0  15  15  12  15 
THA  27.5  36  36  25  25  25  14  15  0  15  15  15 
SEAS  26.8  36  36  27  27  25  20  15  15  0  15  15 
EAS  34  36  36  28  28  25  20  12  15  15  0  15 
ME  33  35  35  27  27  25  20  15  15  15  15  0 
~ 
\0 50 
Table A3 - The preferential tariff example. 
Domestic demand and supply functions, excess demand/supply functions. 
domestic demands  domestic supplies 
country A:  qa =  302  pda  qa  =  48  +  24  PSa 
country B:  qb=  25  pdb  qb  =  5  +  p\ 
country C:  ~=  5  - .5  pdc  ~ =  - 20  +  24.5  pSc 
country D:  ~=  5  - .333  pdd  ~ =  - 95  +  33  pSd 
country E:  ~=  8  pde  ~ =  - 2  +  PSe 
country F:  qf=  12.775  -.05  pdf  qf  =  137.225 +  24.95  pSf 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
corresponding inverse excess supply/demand functions 
country A:  Pa  =  14  + .04  xa 
country B:  Pb  =  10  + .5  xb 
country C:  Pc  =  1  + .04  Xc 
country D:  Pd =  3  + .03  xd 
country E:  Pe  =  5  + .05  xe 
country F:  Pf  =  6  + .04  xf Table A4 - The preferential tariff example. 
.  Transportation costs and tariffs. 
transportation costs matrix 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
A  0  1  1  2.5  2.5  1 
B  1  0  1.5  3  3  1.75 
C  1  1.5  0  2  2  0.5 
D  2.5  3  2  0  1  2 
E  2.5  3  2  1  0  2 
F  1  1.75  0.5  2  2  0 
tariff matrix* 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
A  0  2  0  0  0  0 
B  2  0  0  0  0  0 
C  2  2  0  0  0  0 
D  2 (0)  2  0  0  0  0 
E  2 (0)  2  0  0  0  0 
F  2 (0)  2  0  0  0  0 
•.  (the numbers in parenthesis represents the changes in the tariff matrix when the preferential 
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